December 2, 2024Escalation and Suspension Recommendation
On the same day, shortly after Sunna’s disclosure, the Child Safety Team sought additional support in reviewing the reported concerns.
When the disclosures were reviewed collectively with the full team, the severity and consistency of the information became clear. Particular concern centered on Cecily’s disclosures of personal sexual history to co-educational classes of minors.
During this review, it was also identified that parents had not been notified of these disclosures and that administration had not given permission for such content to be shared with students.
Based on this fuller review, the CST formally recommended suspension. Hans indicated that suspension would proceed. However:
- The suspension letter was modified*
- Cecily was allowed input into the terms of her suspension*
- Hans later removed himself from the process*
December 3–6, 2024Implementation of Suspension and Process Control
Following the Child Safety Team’s recommendation for suspension, contemporaneous text messages* between Director Hans Fung and a member of the Child Safety Team reflect how the suspension and investigative process was managed in practice.
1. Acknowledgment of Behavior, Paired with Contextual Framing
Hans referenced that Cecily had been sharing accounts of addiction with students over multiple years, characterizing this as done “with parents’ permission.” Subsequent conversations with parents indicated that permission had not been granted and they had not been made aware of the content shared.
2. Tension Around Immediate Removal vs. Process Negotiation
A Child Safety Team member stated that “The person being investigated must leave school grounds until the investigation has been completed.” Hans initially indicated compliance but communicated that he was “still working on it with her” and that she was “willing to sign a different version” of the agreement.
3. Modification of Timeline Expectations
Hans relayed that Cecily requested a significantly shortened investigation timeline (e.g., 48 hours), while the Child Safety Team responded that a longer timeframe (e.g., two weeks) was more appropriate.
4. Pressure to Accelerate the Investigation
On the morning of December 3, Hans instructed that the investigation should proceed “as quickly as possible,” interviews should begin within 48 hours, and the situation should be “wrapped up promptly.” He also indicated that board involvement could follow within a matter of days if the situation was not resolved quickly.
5. Separation of Allegations Rather Than Collective Review
Hans communicated that he was initiating a new investigation based on recent allegations and did not recommend combining new allegations with earlier ones. This contrasts with the Child Safety Team’s approach of reviewing disclosures collectively to assess overall pattern and severity.
6. Escalation to Board
By December 4, Hans stated that things were escalating and the board was becoming involved.
December 4, 2024Board Escalation
Internal communications among Child Safety Team members on December 4 reflect developments following board-level involvement*.
- Certain board members, including Jonathan McDonald and Chris DeGarmo, were described as strongly opposed to the suspension decision
- It was stated that these reactions occurred without having read the full suspension documentation
- CST members reported verbal pressure directed toward those involved in the suspension decision
Communications from this period also reflect concerns regarding confidentiality and information flow, with questions raised about how board-affiliated individuals may have had access to details that had not been formally shared.
December 5, 2024Call Reveals Breakdown in Oversight
On December 5, a call was held between the TSIS Board Chair, Vice Chair, a school administrator, and representatives from CRU to address escalating concerns.
CRU entered the call believing the situation had already been resolved, stating “We were being told that process was closed.”
That assumption was immediately contradicted. TSIS leadership disclosed that additional reports had emerged, describing conduct spanning years.
CRU indicated that a leave of absence would typically be recommended as standard procedure; this was not implemented in this case.
CRU acknowledged the seriousness of the situation, stating “The allegations are severe,” but also confirmed its limitations: “We will not be able to interview students and staff.”
By December 5: the scope of concern had expanded, the severity was acknowledged, and the process was already compromised. Multiple parties were making decisions without a shared understanding of the facts.
December 9 & 13, 2024Continued Reports and Further Detail
Following the recommendation for suspension and board escalation, additional reports from students were documented*.
In these disclosures, students provided further detail regarding Cecily’s prior classroom discussions, including that she had described engaging in personal sexual behavior related to the pornography she referenced.
At this stage: reports were ongoing, patterns remained consistent, and the situation remained active despite prior escalation.
December 2024 – January 2025External Review
A third-party investigation was initiated following internal concerns. According to the recollection of an individual close to the situation at the time, two school board leaders made the decision to engage an external reviewer without consulting the full board, and at least one board member opposed involving a third party altogether.
The third-party investigation later confirmed findings* including:
- Inappropriate physical contact
- Behavior consistent with grooming-related concerns
- Failures in supervision
This represented external validation of previously reported concerns.
December 22, 2024Pending Communication, NDA Constraint, and Lack of Clarity
Internal Child Safety Team communications dated December 22, 2024 reflect that Cecily was scheduled to depart for the United States on December 24, while institutional decision-making and communication processes remained unresolved.
Members of the Child Safety Team sought clarification regarding the type and content of the communication being prepared for the community, the nature of the document provided to Cecily, and whether relevant decision-makers had formally approved the document.
Critically, the administrator stated: “CRU asked me to sign an NDA and I am not able to share the details until the decision is made.”
This establishes that external organizational involvement (CRU) imposed confidentiality constraints that directly limited the flow of information to individuals involved in the school’s internal safeguarding process.
January 3, 2025Continued Delay of Communication to Parents
An internal communication* to the CST indicates that, despite the seriousness of the situation, communication to parents had not yet occurred and was still being delayed.
The message states: “We gave her some time to think it over, and that’s what we’ve been waiting on.”
In related communication, an individual close to the situation at the time stated that they believed Cecily may have chosen to resign, but that individuals associated with board-level leadership had been encouraging her to continue contesting the outcome.
January 2025Board Determination — Divergence in Findings
A separate internal board review determined*:
- Other findings were upheld
- Grooming behavior was not substantiated
This created a divergence between external findings and internal conclusions.
According to the recollection of an individual close to the situation at the time:
- The third-party investigator indicated she would not be willing to work in that capacity again with TSIS
- This was attributed to the board’s decision to set aside aspects of her investigation and conduct its own review
- It was also stated that the board’s rationale included the position that the investigator could not determine Cecily’s motives
From here, the issue was no longer only what had been found — but how it would be communicated.